The
election of Hassan Rowhani as Iran's president is surprising – not only
in the very fact of his election, but particularly in the large
majority he received, which made a second round of voting unnecessary.
Prior to the elections, two candidates were considered to lead the race:
Saeed Jalili, who is Iran's
national security advisor and head of the Iranian nuclear negotiating
team, and is very close to Supreme Leader Khamenei; and Tehran’s
popular mayor, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf. In the elections themselves,
Rowhani earned 50.7 percent of the total vote, with each of the other
candidates receiving less than 17 percent.
Rowhani,
who was the only cleric among the candidates and who holds a doctorate
in law, is not one of the leaders of the reformist camp, which rose
following the last presidential election in 2009. However, of all the
candidates Rowhani is closest to the reformers, and he is their main
hope. Presumably, therefore, he was elected mainly by three groups: the
reformists, various minorities that he addressed, and those who saw him
as a chance for relief from the sanctions imposed on Iran
and a chance for improvement in the Iranian economy. In this election,
followers of Supreme Leader Khamenei likely did not attempt to falsify
the election results, as they apparently did in 2009, because they
feared that it would lead to unrest this time, as it did four years ago.
As such, the election of Rowhani appears to reflect both a real desire
for change among the Iranian public and the impact of the sanctions and
the deteriorating economic situation.
The
fact that Rowhani was not disqualified as a candidate for the
presidency, as many others were – in particular, former president
Rafsanjani – may indicate that Khamenei did not feel he would constitute
a major challenge as a president. Nonetheless, his term as president
could create serious difficulties for the Supreme Leader and his
associates, for several reasons. First, Iran
has long experienced tensions between the Supreme Leader and the three
presidents who served during his tenure: Rafsanjani, Khatami, and
Ahmadinejad. These tensions stemmed from the structure of the regime,
which is based on a supreme leader appointed in effect for his entire
life and a president elected in general elections, and from the friction
resulting from the division of powers between them. Second, the
election of Rowhani could revive and strengthen the reformist camp,
which has kept a low profile since it was suppressed in the
demonstrations in the summer of 2009. If this occurs, Rowhani’s election
could serve as an important milestone in shaping the regime. Third, the
fact that Rowhani earned such broad popular support could give him
power vis-à-vis Khamenei and the conservatives.
Nevertheless,
Khamenei may well have an interest in exploiting Rowhani’s image as a
moderate to attempt to have the sanctions lifted and improve Iran’s international standing without paying too heavy a price on the nuclear issue.
It is clear to everyone that the main decision maker in Iran
is the Supreme Leader. However, the president is the second most
important figure, especially in domestic affairs. He appoints the
ministers (in Iran,
there is no prime minister under the president), and he is responsible
for the management and performance of the government and for shaping and
implementing economic policy. While his authority in the realm of
foreign policy and the nuclear issue in particular is limited – the
official who decides this issue is the Supreme Leader – the president
does not lack influence in this area because he is the head of the
Supreme National Security Council, and he presents Iranian policy to the
outside world. The fact that Rowhani has in the past dealt with foreign
affairs and the nuclear issue as head of the nuclear negotiating team
under President Khatami, while Khamenei has not left Iran since his appointment as Supreme Leader in 1989, could enhance the President's influence.
Rowhani
will likely lend high priority to the effort to promote a solution to
the nuclear issue in order to ease the sanctions on Iran.
During the election campaign, he stressed his commitment to a moderate
approach and a solution to the problem of sanctions and Iran’s
international isolation, although like the other candidates, he vowed
to continue the nuclear program. To that end, he is likely to attempt to
formulate new proposals in order to reach an agreement with Western
governments. He may also initiate direct contact with the US administration on this issue. The question is how much leeway Khamenei will give him; it will likely not be much. Khatami, Iran's
president from 1997 to 2005 and considered a moderate, attempted to
publicly initiate a dialogue with the American people, but was stopped
by Khamenei; and during his term in office, an important breakthrough in
uranium enrichment occurred with the construction of the enrichment
facility in Natanz. The more likely possibility is that during the
coming period, Iran
will perhaps be prepared to make tactical concessions on the nuclear
issue, but that Khamenei will not permit concessions with strategic
significance.
Rowhani’s election has been welcomed by the US
administration and other Western governments, which expect that his
presidency will allow real progress on the nuclear issue and will
perhaps even strengthen the reformists and see the start of internal
changes in Iran. They also eye his election as a first sign indicating that the sanctions are beginning to affect Iran,
and therefore they will likely seek to give another opportunity to the
diplomatic option while examining Rowhani’s internal room to maneuver
and his ability to advance a settlement. It is also possible that in
this framework, there will be elements in the West that propose to
lighten the sanctions on Iran in order to provide Rowhani with an
achievement and strengthen his power domestically in advance of a
settlement. In this spirit, at this stage the US administration will likely take the military option off the table and demand that Israel do so as well, until the chances of achieving a settlement with Iran become clear.
From Israel’s
point of view, Rowhani’s election involves both opportunities and
risks. The former include the possibility of a settlement that would be
acceptable to Israel, and the possibility of the start of internal change in Iran. For
now, these possibilities are not very likely. For his part, Rowhani
will likely shun Amadinejad's rhetoric on the need to wipe Israel off the map and denial of the Holocaust, which many in Iran see as a gratuitous error. If this happens, Israel will lose a public relations asset because Ahmadinejad’s harsh statements helped Israel illustrate the threat of a nuclear Iran. More importantly, the moderate image of the new president could help lessen the international pressure on Iran, and later, perhaps even encourage a deal on the nuclear issue that would not be acceptable to Israel.
|
||
INSS - The Institute for National Security Studies 40 Haim Levanon St. • Tel Aviv 61398 • Israel • 03-640-0400 • http://www.inss.org.il • info@inss.org.il |
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Sunday, June 16, 2013
Iran june 16th 2016 inss
Saturday, December 1, 2012
Palestine 29th Nov 2012 -Strong European Support for Palestinian Statehood Move
November 29, 2012
Strong European Support for Palestinian Statehood Move
By REUTERS
UNITED NATIONS (Reuters) - A Palestinian
bid for indirect U.N. recognition of statehood received vows of support
from more than a dozen European nations as of Wednesday, and diplomats
said this backing may deter Israel from harsh retaliation against the
Palestinian Authority for seeking to upgrade its U.N. status.
A Palestinian resolution on Thursday that would change its U.N. observer
status from an "entity" to a "non-member state," implicitly recognizing
the sovereign state of Palestine, is expected to pass easily in the
193-nation U.N. General Assembly. But Israel, the United States and a
handful of other members of are expected to vote against it.
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has been leading the campaign to win
support for the resolution, and some European governments have offered
him their support after an eight-day conflict this month between Israel
and Islamists in the Gaza Strip, who are pledged to Israel's destruction
and oppose his efforts towards a negotiated peace.
The U.S. State Department said Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns and
U.S. Mideast peace envoy David Hale traveled to New York on Wednesday in
a last-ditch effort to get Abbas to reconsider.
"We've been clear, we've been consistent with the Palestinians, that we
oppose observer state status in the General Assembly and this
resolution," State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said.
She repeated U.S. warnings that the move could hit U.S. economic support
for the Palestinians. The Israelis have also warned that they might
take deductions out of monthly transfers of duties that Israel collects
on the Palestinians' behalf.
The United States and Israel say the only genuine route to statehood is
at the negotiating table, through a peace accord hammered out in direct
talks with Israel.
Granting Palestinians the title of "non-member observer state" falls
short of full U.N. membership - something the Palestinians tried but
failed to achieve last year. But it would allow them access to the
International Criminal Court and some other international bodies, should
they choose to join them. The Vatican numbers among the U.N.'s
non-member states.
Hanan Ashrawi, a top Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) official,
told a news conference in Ramallah that "the Palestinians can't be
blackmailed all the time with money."
"Some rights aren't for sale," Ashrawi said. "If Israel wants to
destabilize the whole region, it can. We are talking to the Arab World
about their support if Israel responds with financial measures, and the
EU has indicated they will not stop their support to us."
ISRAELI RETALIATION MIGHT BE MODERATE
As there is little doubt about how the United States will vote when the
Palestinian resolution to upgrade its U.N. status is put to a vote
sometime after 3 p.m. EST (2000 GMT) on Thursday, the Palestinian
Authority has been concentrating its efforts on lobbying wealthy
European states, diplomats say.
With strong support from the developing world that make up the majority
of U.N. members, the Palestinian resolution is virtually assured of
securing more than the requisite simple majority. But Abbas has been
trying to amass as many European yes votes as possible.
"A strong showing in Europe will emphasize to Israel and the United
States that the Palestinian Authority is widely seen legitimate," a
Western envoy said on condition of anonymity. "It may also give Israel
second thoughts about trying to bankrupt the Palestinians for something
that is really symbolic."
One senior Western diplomat predicted that at least 120-130 countries would vote for the Palestinian resolution.
As of Wednesday afternoon Austria, Denmark, Norway, Finland, France,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Spain and
Switzerland had all pledged to support the Palestinian resolution.
Britain said it was prepared to vote yes, but only if the Palestinians
fulfilled certain conditions.
Ashrawi said the positive responses from European states were
encouraging and sent a message of hope to all Palestinians.
"This constitutes a historical turning point and opportunity for the
world to rectify a grave historical injustice that the Palestinians have
undergone since the creation of the state of Israel in 1948," she said.
A strong backing from European nations could make it awkward for Israel
to implement harsh retaliatory measures. Diplomats say that Israel seems
hesitant to take strong action against Abbas as it would antagonize
Western European countries.
But Israel's reaction might not be so measured if the Palestinians seek
ICC action against Israel on charges of war crimes, crimes against
humanity or other crimes the court would have jurisdiction over.
It also seems wary of weakening the Western-backed Abbas, especially
after the political boost rival Hamas received from recent solidarity
visits to Gaza by top officials from Egypt, Qatar and Tunisia.
Hamas militants, who control Gaza and have had icy relations with the
Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, unexpectedly offered Abbas their
support earlier this week.
STALLED PEACE TALKS
No European nations announced they would vote against the non-member
state move, though several U.N. diplomats said privately that the Czech
Republic and Netherlands might be among those that cast no votes.
Neither has announced an official position.
Germany said it could not support the Palestinian move though it was not
clear if it would abstain, like Estonia and Lithuania, or vote against
it.
Europe's undecided countries included European Union members Belgium,
Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Sweden.
Several EU members said they were hoping the 27-nation EU would reach a
common position on the Palestinian move, though U.N. diplomats said that
EU unity was an impossibility.
Peace talks have been stalled for two years, mainly over the issue of
Israeli settlements in the West Bank, which have expanded despite being
deemed illegal by most of the world.
In their draft resolution, the Palestinians have pledged to relaunch the
peace process immediately following the U.N. vote.
Britain said it would be willing to support the Palestinian move on Thursday if two conditions were met.
"The first is that the Palestinian Authority should indicate a clear
commitment to return immediately to negotiations without preconditions,"
Foreign Seretary William Hague told parliament.
"The second assurance relates to membership of other specialized U.N.
agencies and action in the International Criminal Court," he added.
Rights groups said that stance contradicted Britain's stated commitment to accountability for serious crimes.
Israel and the United States have mooted withholding aid and tax revenue
that the Palestinian government in the West Bank needs to survive.
Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman has also viewed options that
include bringing down Abbas.
Syria 1st Dec 2012 Tom Friedman nytimes
December 1, 2012
Letter From Syria
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Darkush, Syria
THE scene is almost biblical. You step down through tall reeds, cross the
Orontes River from Turkey in a small rowboat and are received by a local
contingent of the Free Syrian Army, outside the Syrian town of Darkush. One of
them shows you the picture on his cellphone of a Syrian girl who was just taken
across the river to Turkey with what turned out to be fatal wounds from a Syrian
Army helicopter attack on her village. The helicopters, the rebel soldiers say,
dropped barrels with nails and explosives on her house. Meanwhile, over here in
the mud are three fresh graves with bodies that just floated down the river.
Some days it's just an arm or leg that washes up. Although this is "liberated"
territory, in the background you can hear the low drumbeat of shells slamming
into some town over the hills. I ask the rebel local commander, Muatasim Bila
Abul Fida, how he thinks all of this will play out. His answer strikes me as
very honest. "Without the help of Iran and Hezbollah, he would be gone by now,"
he says of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. But even after he goes, there
will be a great sorting out. "It will take five or six years," he adds, because
the Islamist parties "want Shariah, and we want democracy."
In my visit along the Turkey-Syria border, I am struck at how so many different
people want so many different things for Syria. It is unnerving. A Christian
businessman from Aleppo tells me that if a real election were held in Syria
today, the besieged President Assad would still win "with 75 percent of the
vote," because most Syrians crave the order that he provided and are exhausted
by war. But a few hours earlier at an impressively run Syrian refugee camp set
up by Turkey outside the Turkish border town of Antakya, I interviewed young
Syrian Sunni Muslim men who had fled from the Assad family's largely Alawite
stronghold of Latakiya, just down the coast. They spoke about the deep
unfairness of the Syrian system and how Alawites were getting an unfair share of
the pie. "When we first protested to demand reforms, the regime did not do
anything," said Yahya Afacesa, "and then we started to shout and demand freedom,
and the regime attacked us. So there was no way to fight the regime peacefully."
He and his colleagues insisted, though, that the problem in Syria was the Assad
family, not the Alawite sect, a Shiite offshoot from which the Assads hail and
which dominates the regime. These are secular young men, and they still took
pride in Syria's multisectarian identity and harmony, which, it should be
remembered, has deep historical roots in this region. Indeed, before visiting
them, I met with the Chamber of Commerce of Antakya. The chamber's president
proudly displays outside his office a poster of more than 20 different churches,
mosques and even a synagogue still operating in his town, which is just a few
miles from the Syrian border. I repeat: There are cultural roots for pluralism
in this region that a new Syrian government could still fall back on — but
there's also the opposite.
A case in point: In Antakya I met two Turkish logistics experts. They spoke
about the "Arab foreign legion" of Islamist fighters from as far away as
Chechnya and Libya who have come through their town and crossed the Orontes to
join the battle in Syria. They scoffed at the idea that Syria will emerge as a
democracy from a war in which its main arms suppliers are the Islamic-oriented
monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The main Saudi and Qatari desire is that
Syria shift from being an Iranian-Shiite-dominated country to a Sunni-dominated
one. Democracy per se is not their priority.
One of the two Turkish experts has another business in Qatar. To get permission
to work and operate in Qatar, he explained, he needs a local Qatari to sponsor
his work permit. "If you have a work permit and you want to leave the country,
you need your sponsor to give you written permission," he noted. "If your
sponsor dies, his son inherits that right." His Qatari sponsor's son is very
young. Yet, "if he says I cannot leave, I cannot leave. I do business [in Qatar]
but I have no rights at all. ... We joke that we are `modern slaves' there. And
this country is trying to bring democracy to Syria?"
These stories illuminate for me the enormous number of crosscurrents and mixed
motives driving this revolution. Without a strong, galvanizing Syrian leader
with a compelling unifying vision, backed by the international community,
getting rid of Assad will not bring order to Syria. And disorder in Syria will
not have the same consequences as disorder in other countries in the region.
Syria is the keystone of the Middle East. If and how it cracks apart could
recast this entire region. The borders of Syria have been fixed ever since the
British and French colonial powers carved up the Arab provinces of the Ottoman
Empire after World War I. If Assad is toppled and you have state collapse here,
Syria's civil war could go regional and challenge all the old borders — as the
Shiites of Lebanon seek to link up more with the Alawite/Shiites of Syria, the
Kurds in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey try to link up with each other and create
an independent Kurdistan, and the Sunnis of Iraq, Jordan and Syria draw closer
to oppose the Shiites of Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
We could be entering a new age of Middle East border-drawing — the
do-it-yourself version — where the borders of the Middle East get redrawn, not
by colonial outsiders from the top down but by the Middle Easterners themselves,
from the bottom up.
Letter From Syria
By THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN
Darkush, Syria
THE scene is almost biblical. You step down through tall reeds, cross the
Orontes River from Turkey in a small rowboat and are received by a local
contingent of the Free Syrian Army, outside the Syrian town of Darkush. One of
them shows you the picture on his cellphone of a Syrian girl who was just taken
across the river to Turkey with what turned out to be fatal wounds from a Syrian
Army helicopter attack on her village. The helicopters, the rebel soldiers say,
dropped barrels with nails and explosives on her house. Meanwhile, over here in
the mud are three fresh graves with bodies that just floated down the river.
Some days it's just an arm or leg that washes up. Although this is "liberated"
territory, in the background you can hear the low drumbeat of shells slamming
into some town over the hills. I ask the rebel local commander, Muatasim Bila
Abul Fida, how he thinks all of this will play out. His answer strikes me as
very honest. "Without the help of Iran and Hezbollah, he would be gone by now,"
he says of the Syrian president, Bashar al-Assad. But even after he goes, there
will be a great sorting out. "It will take five or six years," he adds, because
the Islamist parties "want Shariah, and we want democracy."
In my visit along the Turkey-Syria border, I am struck at how so many different
people want so many different things for Syria. It is unnerving. A Christian
businessman from Aleppo tells me that if a real election were held in Syria
today, the besieged President Assad would still win "with 75 percent of the
vote," because most Syrians crave the order that he provided and are exhausted
by war. But a few hours earlier at an impressively run Syrian refugee camp set
up by Turkey outside the Turkish border town of Antakya, I interviewed young
Syrian Sunni Muslim men who had fled from the Assad family's largely Alawite
stronghold of Latakiya, just down the coast. They spoke about the deep
unfairness of the Syrian system and how Alawites were getting an unfair share of
the pie. "When we first protested to demand reforms, the regime did not do
anything," said Yahya Afacesa, "and then we started to shout and demand freedom,
and the regime attacked us. So there was no way to fight the regime peacefully."
He and his colleagues insisted, though, that the problem in Syria was the Assad
family, not the Alawite sect, a Shiite offshoot from which the Assads hail and
which dominates the regime. These are secular young men, and they still took
pride in Syria's multisectarian identity and harmony, which, it should be
remembered, has deep historical roots in this region. Indeed, before visiting
them, I met with the Chamber of Commerce of Antakya. The chamber's president
proudly displays outside his office a poster of more than 20 different churches,
mosques and even a synagogue still operating in his town, which is just a few
miles from the Syrian border. I repeat: There are cultural roots for pluralism
in this region that a new Syrian government could still fall back on — but
there's also the opposite.
A case in point: In Antakya I met two Turkish logistics experts. They spoke
about the "Arab foreign legion" of Islamist fighters from as far away as
Chechnya and Libya who have come through their town and crossed the Orontes to
join the battle in Syria. They scoffed at the idea that Syria will emerge as a
democracy from a war in which its main arms suppliers are the Islamic-oriented
monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The main Saudi and Qatari desire is that
Syria shift from being an Iranian-Shiite-dominated country to a Sunni-dominated
one. Democracy per se is not their priority.
One of the two Turkish experts has another business in Qatar. To get permission
to work and operate in Qatar, he explained, he needs a local Qatari to sponsor
his work permit. "If you have a work permit and you want to leave the country,
you need your sponsor to give you written permission," he noted. "If your
sponsor dies, his son inherits that right." His Qatari sponsor's son is very
young. Yet, "if he says I cannot leave, I cannot leave. I do business [in Qatar]
but I have no rights at all. ... We joke that we are `modern slaves' there. And
this country is trying to bring democracy to Syria?"
These stories illuminate for me the enormous number of crosscurrents and mixed
motives driving this revolution. Without a strong, galvanizing Syrian leader
with a compelling unifying vision, backed by the international community,
getting rid of Assad will not bring order to Syria. And disorder in Syria will
not have the same consequences as disorder in other countries in the region.
Syria is the keystone of the Middle East. If and how it cracks apart could
recast this entire region. The borders of Syria have been fixed ever since the
British and French colonial powers carved up the Arab provinces of the Ottoman
Empire after World War I. If Assad is toppled and you have state collapse here,
Syria's civil war could go regional and challenge all the old borders — as the
Shiites of Lebanon seek to link up more with the Alawite/Shiites of Syria, the
Kurds in Syria, Iraq, Iran and Turkey try to link up with each other and create
an independent Kurdistan, and the Sunnis of Iraq, Jordan and Syria draw closer
to oppose the Shiites of Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
We could be entering a new age of Middle East border-drawing — the
do-it-yourself version — where the borders of the Middle East get redrawn, not
by colonial outsiders from the top down but by the Middle Easterners themselves,
from the bottom up.
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
Egypt 2012 05 23 Historical Elections
יום היסטורי במצרים: 52 מיליון אזרחים יבחרו נשיא | |
| |
Thursday, September 8, 2011
New York 2001 9 11 - Mona Eltahawy Reuters
9/11 anniversary casts shadow for Muslims:author
Thu Sep 8, 2011 6:30am GMT
By Pauline AskinThis is surreal. A Reuters interview with me. I used to be a Reuters correspondent.Mona.
SYDNEY, Sept 8 (Reuters) - The approaching tenth anniversary of the September 11 attacks is casting a long shadow for U.S. Muslims, many of whom are dreading the approaching anniversary because they fear a resurgence of prejudice and hate, said author Mona Eltahawy.
Egyptian-born but U.S.-based, Eltahawy said the attacks on New York and Washington were a shocking and negative introduction to Islam for many in the United States, compounding the difficulties for Muslims already struggling with their identities in the diverse, secular nation.
Despite the fact that African American Muslims had been in the nation since slavery days, public awareness of Muslims in general had remained low.
"A lot of Americans were totally unaware of what a Muslim is until 9/11. The first introduction to Islam was a very negative one," Eltahawy said from Melbourne, where she attended the Melbourne Writer's Festival.
"Now that we're coming up to the tenth anniversary of 9/11, it's a time to say we're here and we're not going anywhere, we're Americans and Muslims too. It's been a difficult ten years and a lot of us are dreading this tenth anniversary because it brings out a lot of hate and prejudice."
Eltahawy, a former news agency journalist turned essayist and columnist, left the security of an office job for the hazards of freelance work just around the time of 9/11.
While she didn't personally experience any hostility, which she attributed largely to the fact that she doesn't wear a head scarf or "look Muslim," the heated atmosphere -- and all the years since -- have made her question what that phrase actually means.
One of her biggest struggles is to break the stereotype that conservative equals authentic.
"I identify as a liberal progressive secular Muslim. One of the messages I try to convey is I'm just as authentic as a conservative Muslim," she said.
"When you think Muslim women, you think women in a head scarf or a women like me. There isn't just one way to think of what a Muslim women is, there's a diversity of appearances and a diversity of voices," she said.
But the last ten years, from 9/11 to the Arab Spring this year that saw the overthrow of long-term Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak, have been exciting and professionally satisfying.
Among some of the biggest and most interesting changes have been the emergence of social media such as Facebook and Twitter, both of which were highlighted during the upheavals in Egypt and elsewhere across the Mideast this year.
Terming them "a great connector," she said such services had played a key role in spreading information, to the extent that she now finds Twitter her number one news source.
"Social media has given us a front row seat to revolutions in various parts of the region but they did not create those revolutions," she said.
Putting too much weight on the role of social media risks devaluing the participation of millions of people, she added.
"These are most definitely not social media revolutions. To say they were social revolutions removes agency and courage from all those people who went out on the streets and faced, whether it was the Mubarak regime security thugs ... or what we saw happening in Libya." (Editing by Elaine Lies)
© Thomson Reuters 2011. All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this website for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Republication or redistribution of Thomson Reuters content, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters and its logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of the Thomson Reuters group of companies around the world.
Monday, May 30, 2011
Gaza Tel Aviv-Yafo 2011-2009 Lawrence Wright New Yorker
The Human Scale
2011-04-04
The Cameri Theatre of Tel Aviv hosts The New York Public Theatre with the one-man play:
The Human Scale
Written and performed by Lawrence Wright
Director: Oskar Eustis
Lighting: Deb Sullivan; Video design: Aaron Harrow; Sound: Matt Hubbs; Scenic consultant: David Korins
In the spring of 2009 Pulitzer prizewinning journalist Lawrence Wright of The New Yorker approached the magazine's editor, David Remnick, and asked if he could write an article about the likelihood of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Most editors would have jumped at the chance of publishing an article by such a well known and admired writer, and on this particular subject - but The New Yorker wasn't crazy about the idea. "I wanted to write about the prospects of a two-state solution," Wright said in an interview, "but David didn't seem too excited. He said, ‘Why don't you write about Gaza?'"
So began Wright's trip to the region in the summer of 2009. The result was a 12,000-word story published in The New Yorker in November, at the height of the controversy over the Goldstone report, which concluded that both Israel and Hamas committed war crimes in the course of Operation Cast Lead.
That article, entitled "Captives: What really happened during the Israeli attacks," has been transformed into a one-man play, written and performed by Wright, in a co-production with The Public Theater and 3-Legged Dog.
The Human Scale, directed by The Public Theatre's artistic director Oskar Eustis, gained critical acclaim in the United States. In it Wright presents his worldview on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years, and explains how the parties reached the present impasse which he argues began with the abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
Like the article, the play sheds new light on both parties. "There's a dehumanization of the other side that makes it impossible to see things from another perspective," Wright said. "My goal was to try to enlarge the vision of both sides."
"In this efficient and engrossing 90-minute seminar on history both current and ancient, Mr. Wright trains his understandably wary attention [...] on the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians With a scholarly but sympathetic manner and a soothing voice that has just a hint of a Texas twang in it, Mr. Wright sheds a sharp light on this sorrowful subject, drawing on his own visit to Gaza."
The New York Times
The play will be performed with English with Hebrew sur-titles
Duration: 90 minutes with no intermission.
18-21 May - Cameri 4
2011-04-04
The Cameri Theatre of Tel Aviv hosts The New York Public Theatre with the one-man play:
The Human Scale
Written and performed by Lawrence Wright
Director: Oskar Eustis
Lighting: Deb Sullivan; Video design: Aaron Harrow; Sound: Matt Hubbs; Scenic consultant: David Korins
In the spring of 2009 Pulitzer prizewinning journalist Lawrence Wright of The New Yorker approached the magazine's editor, David Remnick, and asked if he could write an article about the likelihood of peace between Israel and the Palestinians. Most editors would have jumped at the chance of publishing an article by such a well known and admired writer, and on this particular subject - but The New Yorker wasn't crazy about the idea. "I wanted to write about the prospects of a two-state solution," Wright said in an interview, "but David didn't seem too excited. He said, ‘Why don't you write about Gaza?'"
So began Wright's trip to the region in the summer of 2009. The result was a 12,000-word story published in The New Yorker in November, at the height of the controversy over the Goldstone report, which concluded that both Israel and Hamas committed war crimes in the course of Operation Cast Lead.
That article, entitled "Captives: What really happened during the Israeli attacks," has been transformed into a one-man play, written and performed by Wright, in a co-production with The Public Theater and 3-Legged Dog.
The Human Scale, directed by The Public Theatre's artistic director Oskar Eustis, gained critical acclaim in the United States. In it Wright presents his worldview on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in recent years, and explains how the parties reached the present impasse which he argues began with the abduction of IDF soldier Gilad Shalit.
Like the article, the play sheds new light on both parties. "There's a dehumanization of the other side that makes it impossible to see things from another perspective," Wright said. "My goal was to try to enlarge the vision of both sides."
"In this efficient and engrossing 90-minute seminar on history both current and ancient, Mr. Wright trains his understandably wary attention [...] on the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians With a scholarly but sympathetic manner and a soothing voice that has just a hint of a Texas twang in it, Mr. Wright sheds a sharp light on this sorrowful subject, drawing on his own visit to Gaza."
The New York Times
The play will be performed with English with Hebrew sur-titles
Duration: 90 minutes with no intermission.
18-21 May - Cameri 4
Sunday, May 22, 2011
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